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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
AL&~ DOUGLAS ASAY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 16973 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with theft, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 (1) (a) (i) (1953, as 
amended) . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted by the unanimous verdict 
of a jury before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, in the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of 
Utah, on February 11, 1980. Appellant was sentenced for the 
term provided by law, but the sentence was suspended and 
appellant allowed probation upon payment of a $5000.00 fine 
and restitution, all to be paid within one year, at which 
time, the probation will terminate. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's 
verdict and sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of July 10, 1979, Eric Rasmussen 
drove into Salt Lake City to see a movie. He parked and 
left his car at approximately 8:00-8:30 p.m. (T. 95). At 
approximately 10:30 p.m., Mr. Rasmussen returned to find 
that his car was missing (T. 31). About one hour later, 
Wayne Pasco observed two vehicles pull up in front of his 
home. The first car was left in his gateway and its driver 
got into the second car. This car proceeded down the b+ock 
to a row of storage sheds where the two individuals unlocked 
the gate and one of the storage shed doors. Mr. Pasco 
followed them on his bicycle. The two individuals then 
went back to the first car, drove it inside the unlocked 
storage shed and "pulled the door down quickly behind the 
car." (T. 50). Although Mr. Pasco got within 20 or 30 feet 
of the individuals, it was too dark for him to be able to 
identify either of them (T. 51). 
At approximately 1:00 p.m., on July 11, 1979, Mr. 
Pasco observed that same storage shed door open just a couple 
of feet with a truck parked across the opening. This surprised 
Mr. Pasco since it was a very hot, July day (T. 58). Responding 
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to Mr. Pasco's call, Sergeant Hollbrook, of the Davis Countv 
Sheriff's Office, arrived in time to see appellant carry the 
hood of a car out of the shed and place it in his truck (T.36). 
The vehicle in the shed belonged to Eric Rasmussen (T.33). 
Appellant told the Sergeant that he had purchased the vehicle 
and had a bill of sale at home. But when the Sergeant 
suggested they go to appellant's home to see the bill of 
sale, the appellant became very evasive (T. 38). Sergeant 
Hollbrook testified that "it became quite apparent that he 
did not want us to" accompany appellant to his home (T.37). 
When Deputy Leonard arrived at the scene, he attempted to 
question appellant. Although appellant was "uncooperative," 
he did state "that the vehicle was stolen." (T. 42). 
At trial, appellant offered an explanation of his 
possession of the stolen vehicle. He testified that three 
·weeks before July 10, 1979, he picked up two hitch-hikers 
who said they would call appellant if they came across the 
auto parts he was looking for in order to fix his sister's 
damaged car. On July 10, 1979, these hitch-hikers called 
to tell appellant they had the parts to sell to him. Since 
appellant was going on a _date, he only had time to meet these 
men in town and give them the key to his storage shed. 
Appellant alleges that it was these two hitch-hikers who 
were observed by Mr. Pasco (T. 68-70). 
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j 
This explanation, however, was shown to be incon-
sistent with the facts presented in court. The hitch-hikers 
allegedly called and said they had the parts at 6:00-6:30 
p.m. on July 10, 1979 (T. 76). But the stolen vehicle was 
not out of the victim's possession until 8:00-8:30 p.m. that 
night (T. 95). Appellant had offered to purchase individual 
auto parts, but the "hitch-hikers" delivered an operable 
motor vehicle. Appellant testified that the hitch-hikers 
did not tell him their names, addresses or telephone numbers. 
Also, they did not return to be paid for a vehicle worth in 
excess of $1000.00. Appellant lied to the police regarding 
ownership of the vehicle (T. 37). Appellant did not produce 
his sister to corroborate her ownership of a wrecked mustang, 
and failed to pro~ce any other evidence to prove this assert~~ 
Appellant also testified that he thought he could 
remove the parts he wanted because the car looked "beat up" 




the car was a mess (T. 78). But when shown photos of the car, \ 
I 
appellant admitted that it did not look "beat up." (T. 78). 
The mess appellant was referring to, included a camera, cassette 
tapes and a check book lying on the floor of the car (T. 97). 
During trial, appellant attempted to attack the 
credibility of Deputy Leonard with a prior inconsistent 
statement (T. 43). The prosecution rehabilitated Deputy 
Leonard's testimony with a prior statement, from a police 
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report made at the time of arrest, that was consistent 
with his testimony at trial (T. 91). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON THE PRESUMPTION FOUND 
IN § 76-6-402(1). 
A 
THE PRESUMPTION FOUND IN 
§ 76-6-402(1) IS PERMISSIVE 
NOT MANDATORY. 
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) 
(1953, as amended), which states: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property. 
when properly interpreted, requires that once a defendant 
has offered an explanation of his possession, the prosecution 
must prove that the explanation is unsatisfactory. Appellant 
further argues that jury Instruction #8, given at tria~, which 
states in part: 
You are further instructed that one who 
is found to be in possession of property 
recently stolen, may be found to be the 
guilty person unless he gives a satisfactory 
explanation of his possession thereof. (R.49) 
is improper in that it fails to place the burden on the state 
to prove the explanation unsatisfactory. 
The threshold question is whether the presumption is 
-5-
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permissive ·or mandatory. This will be determined primarily 
through examination of the 'jury instruction involved and' 
if necessary, through interpretation of the statute. 
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 158 n.16 (1979). 
In Ulster, the United States Supreme Court said: 
'.'.It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine 
·the existence of an element of the crime - that is, an 
'ultimate' or 'elemental' fact - from the existence of one 
or more 'evidentiary' or 'basic' facts." Id. at 156. The 
Court defined a mandatory presumption to be one in which the 
trier of fact must find the elemental fact upon proof of 
the .basic fact. An illustrative example of a mandatory 
presumption may be found in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 
510, 515 (1979), in which the jury was instructed: "the law 
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of 
his voluntary acts." The Court found that, without further 
tion is one in which, upon proof of the the basic fact, the 
trier of fact may, but is not required to, infer the elemental 
fact. Ulster County Court v. Allen, supra, at 157 .. 
Since the jury must accept a mandatory presumption, 
and may base its verdict solely on that presumption, the 
Supreme Court said that in order to be constitutionally valid, 
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the mandatory presumption must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. A permissive presumption, however, may be accepted 
or rejected by the trier of fact. It is just one of the many 
pieces of evidence presented at trial, all of which are to 
be weighed in determining guilt. Therefore, a permissive 
presumption need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to be constitutionally valid. 
In Ulster County Court v. Allen, supra, at 173, the 
jury was instructed" ... upon proof of the presence of .. 
. the handweapons, [in the automobile], you may infer and 
draw a conclusion that such prohibited weapon was possessed 
by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile at the 
time when such instruments were found ... " (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court found this to be a permissive presumption. 
Id. at 160-61. 
In the instant case, the jury was instructed: 
" ... one found to be in possession of property recently 
stolen, may be found to be the guilty person ... " (R. 49), 
(emphasis added). Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth 
Edition, defines mandatory as "containing a command," Id. at 
1114, and permissive as "that which may be done," Id. at 1298 
(emphasis added). A reasonable juror would have no difficulty 
in discerning the permissive nature of Instruction #8. 
An examination of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1953, 
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as amended) , confirms the conclusion that this is a permissive 
presumption. The instruction challenged in Ulster, -included 
verbatim, N.Y. Penal Law§ 265.15(3) (McKinney's 1976-77 Supp.) 
which states: "(3) ~he presence in an automobile, .•. of 
any firearm, • is presumptive evidence of its possession 
:qy all persons occupying such automobile at the time s_uch 
-weapon, instrument or appliance is found, except .•. 11 
( empha-sis added) . As previously stated, this instruction 
was found to be constitutionally valid. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1953, as amended), 
states: "(l) possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall 
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property," (emphasfs added). Although there is a 
technical difference between "presumptive evidence" and 
"prima facie evidence," they are often used interchangeably 
and are intended to convey the same idea. Watson v. Rollins, 
9 0 · So . 6 0 , 61 (Al a . 19 21) ; St ate V . Ramsd e 11 , 4 5 N • W . 2d 5 0 3 , 
507 (Iowa 1951); State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 12 A. 794, 
795 (Me. 1888); State v. Simon, 203 N.W. 989, 990 (Minn. 1925); 
State v. Mitchell, 25 S.E. 783, 784 (N.C. 1896); Fightmaster 
v. Mode, 167 N.S. 407, 412 (Ohio 1928). The Utah statute 
was intended to and does create a permissive presumption. 
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B 
THE PERMISSIVE PRESUMPTION 
IS VALID BECAUSE THE PRESUMED 
FACT IS MORE LIKELY THAN NOT 
TO FLOW FROM THE BASIC FACT. 
The test for whether a permissive presumption 
comports with the due process clause, is whether "there is 
a 'rational connection' between the basic facts that the 
prosecution proved and the ultimate facts presumed, and that 
the latter is 'more likely than not to flow from' the former." 
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165 (1979). See 
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969); Tot v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943). 
In McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520 (1912), the 
petitioner contended that his possession of recently stolen 
I· property did not support the conclusion that he committed 
the burglary. The Supreme Court said: 
The evidence pointed to the appellant as one 
having control of the car and engaged in the-
endeavor to secure the fruits of the burglarious 
entry. Possession in these circumstances tended 
to show guilty participation in the burglary. 
This is but to accord to the evidence, if 
unexplained, its natural probative force. 
(Citations omitted) Id. at 524-525. 
In State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 133, 499 P.2d 
276, 279 (1972), this Court said that the presumption arising 
from possession of recently stolen property is just "a 
codification of a natural process of deductive reasoning." 
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This Court has repeatedly upheld convictions based on this 
permissive presumption. E.g., State v. Sessions, 58.3 P.2d 
44 (Utah 1978); State v. Gonzales, 30 Utah 2d 302, 517 P.2d 
547 (1973); State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244 P.2d 653 (1952). 
c 
A PERMISSIVE PRESUMPTION DOES 
NOT SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 
It is clear that the prosecution must prove all 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re 
Windship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Appellant contends that 
Instruction #8 required him to prove his explanation satis-
factory, rather than force the prosecution to prove the 
explanation unsatisfactory. Appellant has failed to distin-
guish between the burden of production and the burden of 
persuasion. 
In Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973), 
the jury was instructed that possession of recently stolen 
property, if not satisfactorily explained, allows for the 
inference that the person in possession knew the property 
had been stolen. The Supreme Court said: 
It is true that the practical effect of 
instructing the jury on the inference 
arising from unexplained possession of 
recently stolen property is to shift the 
burden of going forward with evidence to 
the defendant. If the Government proves 
possession and nothing more, this evidence 
remains unexplained unless the defendant 
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introduces evidence, since ordinarily 
the Government's evidence will not 
provide an explanation of possession 
consistent with innocence . . . [and] 
..• where there is a 'rational connec-
tion' between the facts proved and the 
fact presumed or inferred, it is 
permissible to shift the burden of 
going forward to the defendant. 
Id. at 846 n. 11, (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged this in 
State v. Kirkman, 20 Utah 2d 44, 46, 432 P.2d 638, 639 (1967), 
in which it said: 
There would be a duty upon the one in 
possession of such property to explain 
his possession if he is to remove that 
adverse inference against him pointing 
toward his guilt; and if he gives a 
false account of how he acquired that 
possession, or having a reasonable 
opportunity to show that his possession 
was honestly acquired he refuses or 
fails to do so, such conduct is a 
circumstance which may be considered by 
the jury along with all other evidence 
bearing upon the case in determining 
guilt or innocence. 
Accord, State v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d 13, 15, 492 P.2d 97~, 979 
(1972); State v. Little, 5 Utah 2d 42, 44, 296 P.2d 289, 291 
(1956). This Court has frequently rejected the contention 
that the statutory presumption places an unconstitutional 
burden on the defendant. E.g., State v. Smelser, 23 Utah 2.d 
347, 350, 463 P.2d 562, 565 (1970); State v. Little, supra; 
State v. wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 37, 268 P.2d 998, 1000 (1954). 
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And in Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979), 
the Supreme Court said that a permissive presumption "does 
not shift the burden of proof." 
This Court_ has said that an unsatisfactory explanation 
is one which is false, unreasonable or improbable,-while a 
satisfactory explanation is one in which a jury of ordinary 
-intelligence, discretion and caution may repose confidertce. 
State v. Brooks, 101 Utah 584, 591, 126 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1942). 
The burden on the defendant is to explain his possession. 
If he is innocent of any wrondoing, then his explanation will 
be reasonable and satisfactory. See State v. Eastmond, 28 
Utah 2d 129, 133, 499 P.2d 276, 2?9 (1972). To say, however, 
that the burden of producing a satisfactory explanation rests 
on the defendant is misleading, because the permissive 
presumption "need not be rebutted by affirmative proof or 
· affirmative evidence but may be rebutted by any evidence or 
lack of evidence in the case." Ulster County Court v. Allen, 
supra, at 161 n. 20. 
Appellant makes the untenable argument that a 
defendant may offer any explanation of his possession and 
that explanation will be deemed satisfactory until specifically 
rebutted by the prosecution. This contention was rejected in 
State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 642, 244 P.2d 653, 655 (1952), 
where the Court said "[The] explanation, standing by itself, 
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may be regarded as 'satisfactory.' However, it is to be 
measured in the light of all the surrounding circumstances 
and the other evidence in the case." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1953, as amended), 
does not require the prosecution to prove that a silent 
defendant cannot offer a satisfactory explanation, State v. 
Jolley, 571 P.2d 582, 584 (Utah 1977), nor does it require 
the prosecution to produce rebuttal evidence when a defendant 
offers a vague, unreasonable and improbable explanation. 
The Supreme Court in Barnes v. United States, 412 
U.S. 837 (1973), said: 
. • • the mere fact that there is some 
evidence tending to explain the defendant's 
possession consistent with innocence 
a fact not present in the instant case, 
• . • does not bar instructing the jury 
on the inference. The jury must weigh 
the explanation to determine whether it 
is 'satisfactory' ... The jury is not 
bound to accept or believe any particular 
explanation any more than it is bound to 
accept the correctness of the inference. 
Id. at 845, n. 9, (emphasis added). 
Since the jury is free to reject any explanation offered by 
a defendant in light of the evidence adduced at trial, it 
necessarily follows that there is no burden on the prosecution 
to produce additional evidence in rebuttal. 
Upon completion of the prosecution's case, appellant 
offered a fanciful tale of mystery hitch-hikers who clandestinely 
delivered a vehicle to his storage shed. To aid the jury, the 
-13-
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prosecution highlighted several inconsistencies between 
this tale and the evidence. 
Appellant testified that these mystery men called 
him at 6:00-6:30 p.m., on the night of the theft, to say 
they had the parts he wanted, (T. 76), but the vehicle was 
not out of the victim's possession until 8:00-8:30 p.m. 
(T. 95). The mystery men had offered to sell the parts·to 
appellant, but they never returned to be paid for them (T. 80). 
Appellant testified that he thought he could remove the 
desired auto parts because the car looked "beat up" and like 
a "junk heap" (T. 77), but when appellant was shown photos 
of the car at trial, he acknowledged that the vehicle did not 
look "beat up" (T. 78). The prosecution also pointed out 
that a camera, cassette tapes and check book were in plain 
view on the floor of the vehicle, suggesting that it was 
unreasonable to believe the vehicle was old and abandoned (T. 97 
Finally, the parts were supposedly needed to repair appellant's 
sister's mustang (T. 68), but appellant's sister was not 
called to corroborate this. The jury evaluated this expla-
nation in light of the evidence adduced at trial and rejected 
it as unsatisfactory. 
D 
WHEN THE INSTRUCTION IS CONSID-
ERED IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE CHARGE, 
THE JURY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MISLED. 
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A permissive presumption does not shift the 
burden of proof. Even if we assume that there was some 
error in the wording of the instruction, any harmful affect 
was eliminated by the rest of the charge. 
517, 520 
In State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 
(1968), this Court said: 
If [the instructions] are looked at all 
together as they should be, the issues 
to be determined were stated to the jury 
in a clear and understandable manner. 
The trial judge adequately explained to 
them the elements of both [crimes] as 
defined in our penal code, and that they 
must find each and all of them beyond a 
reasonable doubt before they could render 
the verdict of guilty. 
Accord, State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777, 779 (Utah 1979); State 
v. Burch, 17 Utah 2d 418, 419, 413 P.2d 805, 807 (1966). 
In the instant case the jury was clearly instructed 
regarding the elements of theft as defined in our criminal 
code (Instruction #8, R. 49). The jury was further instructed 
that it must presume the innocence of the defendant and that 
it may not find the defendant guilty of the crime charged 
until the prosecution has proved guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. (Instructions #7, #10, R. 48, 50). When looked at as 
a whole, the ·charge properly instructed the jury on the elements 
of the crime of theft and on the burden of proof which the 
prosecution must meet. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON THE ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL INTENT. 
The jury was instructed that in order to find 
appellant guilty, they must find that each of five elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonble doubt. The fourth 
element required that the defendant: 
4. Did commit the offense of theft, 
in that he did obtain or exercise unauthorized 
control over the property of another, to-wit, 
an automobile in operable condition, with 
the purpose to deprive the owner therec:>I:"" 
(R.49, emphasis added.) 
This is a nearly verbatim statement of the language in 
the Utah theft state, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953, 
as amended) . 
It would seem to be unnecessary to point out 
that the phrase· "obtain or exercise unauthorized control 
over the property of another" constitutes the actus reus 
of theft; the proscribed conduct, and that the phrase 
"with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof" constitutes 
the requisite mens rea or criminal intent. Appellant, 
however, argues that the underlined portion of element 
4 does not relate to intent, but somehow further defines 
the physical act. Appellant hypothesizes that "a person 
purchasing merchand1se in a store has the purpose to deprive 
the owner of the property under the definition stated at 
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76-6-401(3) but still lacks criminal intent." (App. Brief 
at 7). Appellant fails to consider that once an agreed 
upon exchange, i.e. sale, has taken place, the purchaser 
is the owner of the property. The three definitions of 
"purpose to deprive" found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3) 
(1953, as amended), all contain an element of loss or injury 
to the owner. No reasonable construction of the theft 
statute could lead to the conclusion drawn by appellant. 
Appellant asserts that "nothing in the statutory 
definition of "purpose to deprive" requires that the 
defendant know that he has no right to withhold the 
property from the owner, or know that his taking is 
wrongful." (App. Brief at 7). Appellant wants this Court 
to believe that he may obtain unauthorized possession of 
the property of another with the intent to benefit thereby 
to the detriment of the true owner, and yet, not realize 
that his taking is wrong. Such a position is palpably . 
untenable. 
That the instant statute and instruction say 
"purpose to deprive" instead of "intent to deprive" does 
not remove the element of intent from the consideration 
of the jury. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 
at 1400, defines "purpose" as "an end, intention, or aim." 
It further defines "intent" as "purpose, signification, 
intendment," and "intention" as "will, purpose, design." 
Id. at 947. Ballantine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, 
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at 1028, defines 11 purpose 11 as 11 an intention 11 and 11 intention 11 
as "purpose. That which is intended," and 11 intent 11 as 
"with fixed purpose, Noun: purpose. 11 Id. at 646. That 
11 intent" and "intention" are synonymous, see Words and 
Phrases, Perm. Ed. Vol. 22, at 12, 22-23. This Cou.rt has 
frequently held that "purpose to deprive 11 constitutes 
the mens rea element of the crime of theft. E.g., State.v. 
Norman Laine, No. 16768, decided September 12, 1980; 
State v. Smith, 571 P.2d 578, 581 (Utah 1977). 
Appellant made no objection to Instruction #13 
at trial, but now attempts to attack the instruction-
on appeal alleging two deficiencies. Under Utah R. Civ. 
·p., Rule 51, appellant may not assign error to an 
instruction which he took no exception to. State v. 
International Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977); 
_Patton v. Evans, 92 Utah 524, 529, 69 P.2d 969, 971 (1937). 
Valid state interests are promoted by adherence to the 
rule; consequently, it should be rarely circumvented. 
State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1976); State v. 
Carter, 27 Utah 2d 416, 418, 497 P.2d 26, 27 (1972). 
Rule 51, however, does allow the reviewing court, 
in the interests of justice, to consider the giving of 
or failure to give an instruction where no objection was 
made. This Court has exercised this power where the 
error has amounted to a denial of due process. State v. 
Villiard, 27 Utah 2d 204, 205, 494 P.2d 285. 2A~ r1a,~' -
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see State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 101, 60 P.2d 952, 958 (1936). 
In the interests of justice, the state will respond 
to the alleged deficiencies improperly raised by appellant 
and to an issue presented in Instruction #13 which appellant 
has not addressed. 
Appellant acknowledges that the instructions are 
to be read as a whole but fails to do just that. Appellant 
first alleges that Instruction #13 (R. 52) , fails to 
instruct the jury that the state must prove intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The jury was so instructed in Instruction 
Nos. 7, 8 and 10 (R.48,49,50). Second, that Instruction 
#13 fails to require that the requisite criminal intent 
exist at the time of the taking. Instruction #8 states 
that defendant must "obtain control • with the purpose 
to deprive." (Emphasis added.) When the instructions are 
read as a whole, State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 276, 444 
P.2d 517, 520 (1968), there is no error. 
Appellant further attempts to argue that 
Instruction #13 was improper based upon State v. Smith, 
571 P.2d 578 {Utah 1977), in which the defendant was charged 
with issuing a bad check and theft by deception. Appellant 
misstated the facts of that case when he said the defendant 
ultimately intended to honor the check he uttered in exchange 
for a deed {App. Brief at 9). This Court found that 
defendant uttered a check for $32,453 on an account whose 
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balance never exceeded $1,045 and which was overdrawn at 
that time by $539. This Court concluded that the funds 
promised to cover the check were nonexistent. In Smith, 
the jury was instructed that to find defendant guilty of 
theft by deception, they must find that the property was 
intentionally and knowingly obtained and that it was 
obtained by deception and with the purpose to deprive 
the true owners thereof. This Court said, "[t]he jury 
was properly instructed with regard to culpable mental 
state." Id. at 581. 
An additional and apparently unnecessary 
instruction, regarding mental state, was given in Smith. 
·Instruction #12, therein, is nearly identical to 
Instruction #13 given in the instant case, Defendant 
~mith argued that the instruction had the effect of 
presuming intent from the act. This Court found no error 
in the giving of Instruction #12 and said that it is 
mer~ly a statement that "ignorance of the law is no 
defense." Id. at 580-581. 
Appellant attempts to argue that Instruction 
#13 is improper in this case because the issue, 
herein, is a mistake of fact, while in Smith, the issue 
was a mistake of law (App. Brief at 9). Appellant has 
failed to discern the real issue raised by Instruction #13. 
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The specific problem with Instruction #13 is that it defines 
general criminal intent, while the crime of theft requires 
a specific criminal intent. The argument to be made is that 
the jury might convict upon finding general intent, i.e., 
that defendant intentionally did that which the law declares 
to be a crime, even though he may not know that his actions 
are unlawful. The crime of theft however, requires the 
specific intent of, "with the purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof." It appears that neither party in State v. Smith, 
supra, adequately presented this issue to the Court. 
The California courts have held that giving the 
irrelevant general intent instruction is error, but not 
necessarily prejudicial error. For example, in People v. 
Butcher, 345 P.2d 127 (Cal. 1959), the defendant was charged 
with rape, robbery and burglary. The jury was instructed on 
both general and specific criminal intent but was not instructed 
as to which intent was required for each crime. The court 
found that where the only real evidence was uncontradicted 
by the defendant, the evidence was so conclusive that the 
error did not influence the verdict. Id. at 134. In the 
instant case, the state's evidence was essentially uncontradicted. 
The only evidence presented by appellant was the patently 
unbelievable tale he told in court. When the jury properly 
rejected this tale as fa~se, the only evidence to be considered 
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was the state's case in chief. 
In People v. Booth, 243 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1952}, 
the jury was instructed on general criminal intent and on 
the specific intent _required for the crime of lewd and 
lascivious acts with a child under 14. This error-was 
found to be non-prejudicial where the acts were "such _as 
-to preclude the belief they were committed without criminal 
intent." Id. at 874. In the instant case, appellant was 
found in possession of recently stolen property, under 
circumstances suggesting that he was attempting to conceal 
that property from view while he secured the fruits of the 
crime (T. 58}. At the time of his arrest appellant made 
an incriminating statement, (T. 42}, and at trial he gave 
an unreasonable and unbelievable explanation of his possession 
of the stolen property. These actions are wholly inconsistent 
with innocence, and preclude any belief that they were 
committed without criminal intent. It was error to give 
In~truction #13, in the instant case, because that instruction 
was irrelevant to the matter to be considered by the jury. 
But that error has not prejudiced appellant and therefore 
does not warrant reversal of his conviction. Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 30; see also, State v. Villiard, 
27 Utah 2d 204, 205, 494 P.2d 285, 286 (1972}. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON APPELLANT'S THEORY 
OF THE CASE. 
Appellant correctly states that in order to receive 
an instruction based upon the statutory defenses found in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(3} (1953, as amended}, he must 
present evidence which is consistent with the legislative 
intent embodied in the statute. The focus of the evidence, 
however, is of secondary concern. The real question is whether 
appellant has presented substantial evidence to support his 
theory. State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1390 (Utah 1977}; 
State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 564, 144 P.2d 290, 292 (1943}. 
This Court set the standard in State v. Castillo, 
23 Utah 2d 70, 72, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (1969}: 
If the defendant's evidence, although in 
material conflict with the state's proof, be 
such that the jury may entertain a reasonable 
doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-
defense, he is entitled to have the jury 
instructed •.• [on that theory]. Conversely, 
if all reasonable men must conclude that the 
evidence is so slight as to be incapable of 
raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind 
as to whether a defendant accused of a crime 
acted in self-defense, tendered instructions 
thereon are properly refused. 
Appellant's fanciful tale, presented at trial, is 
nothing more than a self-serving fiction, totally devoid of 
substance or corroborating facts. Appellant attempts to find 
corroboration in the testimony of Wayne Pasco (App. Brief at 
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15). When asked if he got close enough to identify the 
two men at the storage shed, Mr. Pasco testified, "I.got 
at one point within 20 or 30 feet, but being near 11:30 
[p.m.], it was very dark." (T.51). It requires a rather 
tortured reading of Mr. Pasco's testimony to conclude 
that it somehow supports the story of appellant. In 
State v. Talarico, 57 Utah 229, 234, 193 P. 860, 861 
(1920), this Court said: "While the theory of counsel, 
persistently and strenuously urged, was that of self-
defense, it was nevertheless all theory and no evidence, 
all shadow and no substance." Appellant's story, herein, 
is nothing more than shadow. A spectre of the truth. 
Even if the trial court had erred in refusing 
to give the requested instruction, that error would have 
been harmless. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30. 
~he instructions, when read as a whole, require the jury 
to consider the testimony of appellant in reaching its 
verdict. 
Instruction #2 (R. 43) , instructed the jury to 
"weigh and consider all of the evidence and circumstances 
shown by the evidence," in arriving at a verdict. Instruc-
tion #4 (R. 45) , informed the jury that the defendant is 
a competent witness and that his testimony should be weighed 
the same as that of any other witness. Instruction #11 
(R.51), required the jury to impartially consider and 
compare all of the evidence. Instruction ~7 in 
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required the jury to find appellant not guilty so long as a 
reasonable doubt exists. See State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 
1390 (Utah 1977). 
The trial court properly refused to instruct the 
jury on the appellant's theory of the case. If this ruling 
was error, appellant was not substantially prejudiced since 
the jury heard and considered his testimony in reaching a 
verdict. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE A PORTION OF THE POLICE REPORT 
IN ORDER TO REHABILITATE THE CHALLENGED 
TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY LEONARD. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
admitting into evidence the following portion of a police 
report prepared by Deputy Esplin who recorded the information 
relayed by Deputy Leonard: 
Deputy Esplin then took charge of the 
case and Deputy Leonard talked to the 
individual, Doug Asay, who had already been 
advised of his rights and was asked if the 
vehicle had been stolen, at which time Mr. 
Asay admitted that the vehicle had been 
stolen (T.91). 
Appellant's hearsay objection to this evidence was overruled 
at trial. 
In order to be hearsay, the admitted portion of 
the police report must have been offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the statement made. The report was not 
offered to prove that the car was stolen, but to show that 
Deputy Leonard reported that such a 
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statement had been made by the appellant. The report relayed 
information, based on the personal knowledge and observations 
of Deputy Leonard, that the statement was made, without regard 
to its being true or false. See State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 
198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957). 
Even if the prior consistent statement was found 
to be hearsay, it was, nevertheless, admissible as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Utah R. Evid. 66, makes 
admissible hearsay within hearsay, where each level of hearsay 
is itself admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. 
The two levels of hearsay in this case would be (1) the 
prior consistent statement of Deputy Leonard, and (2) the 
·police report prepared by Deputy Esplin. 
As for Deputy Leonard's prior consistent statement, 
Utah R. Evid. 63(1) (c), makes admissible a prior statement of 
.a witness where "it will support testimony made by the witness 
in the present case when such testimony has been challenged." 
Deputy Leonard testified at trial that, at the time 
of arrest, appellant said "that the vehicle was stolen" 
(T.42). Appellant attempted to challenge this statement on 
cross-examination and through the testimony of a Mr. Carlson, 
asserting that a few nights before trial, Deputy Leonard told 
Mr. Carlson that at the time of arrest, appellant "made no 
statements to him whatsoever" (T.86). Where a witness' 
testimony has been so challenged, prior statements of that 
witness are admissible where they are cnnc:i c+-~"".a.. --.! _._,_ 
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testimony at trial. 
The police report is admissible under Utah R. Evid. 
63(15) as the report of a public official, prepared within 
the scope of his dut~ to investigate the incident. In 
Barney v. Cox, 588 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978), apparently the 
only case in which this Court has addressed the scope of 
Rule 63(15), the Court suggested that a computer printout 
of a driver's accumulated point totals may be admissible 
under Rule 63(15), as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Id. at 698. A computer printout presents the possibility, 
not present in the instant case, of a programming error when 
the information is typed into the computer. In this case, 
however, Deputy Esplin made the report at the time of the 
arrest and Deputy Leonard was available at trial, to be 
cross-examined as to the accuracy of the statement he heard 
and relayed to Deputy Esplin. 
If the prior consistent statement had been offered 
to prove the truth of the matter stated therein, it would 
have been admissible for the reason that both the statement 
and the police report were individually admissible under 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
Since this prior statement was not hearsay, the 
real issue is whether~ the trial court properly allowed the 
state's witness' testimony to be bolstered by prior 
consistent statements. 
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The rule in Utah is that prior consistent statements 
are admissible where credibility has been attacked through 
introduction of prior inconsistent statements. See Utah 
R. Evid. 20. 
In State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d. 861. 
(1948), a first degree murder case, the testifying medical 
examiner was cross-examined regarding alleged inconsistencies 
in his previous statements. The trial court refused to admit 
into evidence the full autopsy report prepared by that 
individual, but did allow a portion of the report to be 
read into evidence. This court found that the portion read, 
was consistent with the witness' testimony at trial and 
·admissible. 
In the instant case, the trial court admitted into 
evidence only that portion of the police report which went 
to Deputy Leonard's challenged testimony. That portion was 
consistent with his testimony at trial and was properly 
admitted. 
In State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 
(1957), involving the offense of robbery, a state's witness 
was cross-examined regarding prior inconsistent statements. 
In order to rehabilitate the witness, a police officer was 
allowed to testify to a prior statement of the witness, 
essentially consistent with the witness' testimony at trial, 
which had been made to that officer. This Court said: "We 
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think the better view is that where there has been an 
attempt to impeach or discredit a witness, prior statements 
consistent with his present testimony may be offered to off set 
the impeachment." Id. at 391. The Court found the prior 
statements to be relevant to credibility and therefore of 
aid to the jury. in arriving at the truth. The case was, 
however, reversed and remanded on other grounds. 
In the instant case, Deputy Leonard's testimony 
was discredited through evidence of an alleged prior 
inconsistent statement. The trial court properly admitted 
into evidence that portion of the report which was relevant 
to Deputy Leonard's credibility and which was consistent with 
his testimony at trial. 
POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE 
THE APPELLk~T GUILTY BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT. 
It is well established in Utah that in order for 
a convicted defendant to succeed in challenging on appeal 
the sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, he must estab-
lish that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial 
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Daniels, 
584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 
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1977); State v. Jones, 554 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1976). Those 
cases also establish that in considering a claim of -insuffi-
ciency of the evidence on appeal, this Court must assume that 
the trier of fact believed those aspects of the evidence and 
drew such reasonable inferences therefrom as support the 
yerdict. 
Appellant correctly points out that mere possession 
of recently stolen property, when not coupled with other 
culpatory or incriminating facts, does not alone justify a 
conviction. 
In State v. Kinsey, 77 Utah 348, 295 P. 247 (1931), 
this Court said: "[p]ossession of articles recently stolen, 
when coupled with circumstances of hiding or concealing them, 
or of disposing or attempting to dispose of them, or of making 
false or unreasonable or unsatisfactory explanations of the 
·possession, may be sufficient to connect the possessor with 
the conunission of the offense." Id. at 249. Accord, State v. 
Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244 P.2d 653 (1952). 
In the instant case, while dismantlinq the vehicle, 
appellant attempted to conceal it from view by opening the 
shed door just a couple of feet and parking his truck in 
front of the door (T. 58). Appellant was, in a sense, disposin 
of the vehicle by removing the parts that he wanted (T. 36,56}. 
Finally, appellant presented a patently unbelievable story 
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at trial. 
In State v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d 13, 492 P.2d 978 
(1972), the Court said "[i]n addition to the ... possession 
by the defendant, there must be proof of corroborating circum-
stances tending of themselves to show guilt. Such corroborating 
circumstances may consist of the acts, conduct, falsehoods, 
if any, or other declarations, if any, of the defendant which 
tend to show his guilt." Id. at 979. 
In the instant case, when appellant was first con-
fronted at the storage shed by the police, he stated the car 
was his and that he had a bill of sale at home. When asked 
if the police could accompany appellant to his home to see 
the bill of sale, appellant became very evasive. (T. 36-38). 
Appellant basically conceded that his conduct at the time 
of arrest implied guilt (App. Brief at 30). These corroborating 
facts tend to show guilt and when considered in conjunction 
with appellant's possession of the stolen vehicle, are suffi-
cient to support his conviction. See State v. Sessions, 583 
P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1978). 
Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence 
in two ways. First, appellant relies on dicta in State v. 
Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976), to suggest that where the 
case is based on circumstantial evidence, "the circumstances 
must reasonably preclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
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defendant's innocence ... " Id. at 219. It is unclear 
how much, if at all, this increases the burden of the 
prosecution. In any event; the uncontrovert~ble evidence 
presented, herein, by the prosecution, appellant's admission 
at the time of arrest and the unbelievable story he told 
in court, preclude any reasonable belief in his innocence. 
Second, appellant attempts to argue that the 
evidence never showed that he was in possession of an operable 
motor vehicle as he was charged in the complaint (App. Brief 
at 28) . Appellant argues that when he was first found in 
possession of the vehicle, on the afternoon of July 11, 1979, 
it was not operable. Once the jury rejected appellant's 
explanation as false, they could reasonably find that he was 
one of the two individuals who delivered the vehicle to his 
storage shed on the night of July 10, 1979, and that the auto 
- was not operable the next day when the police confronted him 
because he was in the process of dismantling it. 
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that reasonable 
minds must have entertained reasonable doubt about his guilt. 
State v. Daniels, supra; State v. Wilson, supra; State v. Jones 
supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The permissive presumption found in § 76-6-402(1) 
does not shift the burden of proof to the appellant. It may, 
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however, require that the appellant came forward with 
evidence consistent with innocence. 
The jury was properly instructed as to the intent 
required for the offense of theft. Instruction #8 recited 
the language of § 76-6-401(3) regarding criminal intent. 
The general intent instruction was irrelevant to the issue 
to be decided by the jury, but under the circumstances of 
this case, the appellant was not prejudiced. 
Appellant was not entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case because he presented 
no credible evidence to support that theory. 
The portion of the police report admitted in evidence 
was admissible to bolster the discredited testimony of Deputy 
Leonard. Even if that report was hearsay, it was admissible 
as an exception to the hearsay rule, to rehabilitate the 
witness' challenged testimony. 
The prosecution proved that appellant was in -
possession of recently stolen property and that his expla-
nation of that possession was unsatisfactory. Appellant 
has failed to show that reasonable minds must have entertained 
some doubt as to his guilt. The evidence was sufficient to 
support the conviction. The judgment of the Second Judicial 
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District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully su~mitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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